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The past quarter century has seen a significant growth of interest in ‘plural’ policing.  
This relates, in part, to the very substantial expansion of private, predominantly 
commercial, security guards worldwide that has occurred in recent decades. 
However, the notion of plural policing also includes a range of other policing 
authorizers and providers, located within public, private or third sectors (or a mix 
thereof). Much of the writing on the pluralization of policing has focused primarily on 
trends in North America. There is a tendency to assume that the nature and degree of 
changes in policing are similar around the globe. However, research suggests that 
there are very different patterns of change in various parts of the world. It remains 
the case that little is known about the specific conditions that shape plural policing, 
and how these differ between national contexts. This paper explores the growth of 
plural policing within two EU countries – the Netherlands and Britain. It discusses 
areas of similarity and difference, and speculates about what factors might explain 
these. It suggests that changes in the policing systems of both countries can be related 
to a growing ‘formalization’ of social control, and to the distinctive political cultures 
and institutions in each country. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the Second World War, and most visibly over the past twenty-five years, security 
industries have been expanding around the globe. The privileged position of the public police 
in patrolling, surveillance and investigation has been increasingly challenged by commercial, 
providers (de Waard, 1999; van Dijk & de Waard, 2001; van Steden & Sarre, 2007). In 
addition, other forms of security provision – public, private and community organised – have 
proliferated on the policing landscape (Crawford, Lister, Blackburn & Burnett, 2005; Jones & 
Newburn, 2006a). Although the growing importance of private security is widely recognized, 
the industry remains surprisingly under-researched. We know very little about what private 
security contains and its effects on the ‘governance of security’ (Johnston & Shearing, 2003; 
Wood & Dupont, 2006). We know even less about the other forms of plural policing that 
have emerged in recent decades. This underlines the need for a more comprehensive 
understanding of what factors explain the emergence of plural policing. Furthermore, despite 
recent important Anglo-American publications on the conceptual and practical aspects of 
plural policing, there remains a striking lack of continental European research on this 
phenomenon. Academic thinking about plural policing is heavily suffused with Anglophone – 
predominantly U.S.A. and Canadian – insights (Brogden, 1987; Manning, 2005). 
Nevertheless, it has been recognized that knowledge from other countries is of major 
importance for better grasping the similarities and differences between national contexts, and 
to gain deeper insights into developments in jurisdictions worldwide (Jones & Newburn, 
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2006b; Mawby, 1999). Scholarly work from outside English-speaking nations has much to 
contribute – theoretically, empirically and normatively – to a more subtle and nuanced view 
of what is happening to policing today.  
 
This paper compares developments in plural policing in two European countries, the 
Netherlands and Britain2
 
. The selection of countries partly rests on pragmatic considerations: 
the Netherlands and Britain are two nations where a significant body of work in the area of 
plural policing has been undertaken and where both authors, given their nationalities, have 
most knowledge of. However, there are also other compelling reasons why comparison 
between the two countries is useful. Both jurisdictions exhibit strong similarities with regard 
to long-standing democratic traditions, the existence of regional police systems and rapid 
expansions of private security industries. On the other hand, there are important contrasts that 
make cross-national comparisons especially interesting and informative. Divergence in 
political and legal institutions, economic conditions, historical backgrounds and cultural 
values are likely to play a fundamental role in shaping distinctive national pathways and 
outcomes. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we 
provide a general account of plural policing in the Netherlands and Britain. The following 
section highlights some key factors, drawn from the existing literature on plural policing that 
might help to explain present trends. These factors include growing concerns about crime and 
security, the fiscal crisis of the public police, the growth of mass private property, 
government policies toward private sector participation, and the formalization of social 
control. The third section highlights the differences found between the Netherlands and 
Britain, and suggests possible explanations of these. The final section draws some general 
conclusions and reflects on the importance of legal and political context in shaping 
developments in policing systems.   
2. Plural policing in the Netherlands and England & Wales 
 
‘Pluralization’ of policing refers to a number of distinct developments. The focus here is 
upon three key elements of plural policing: the commercial security sector, other forms of 
policing provision, and ‘marketization’ of the public policing sector. We here outline recent 
developments in these aspects of plural policing in the Netherlands and England & Wales.  
 
2.1 Commercial policing 
 
The Netherlands Statistics Bureau (Centraal Bureau for Statistiek; CBS)3
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 provides a snapshot 
of the Dutch private security industry at large, but does not distinguish between 
miscellaneous aspects of security work. CBS introduced the occupational category ‘guarding 
and investigation services’ only in 1994/1995, which makes it impossible to analyse longer 
term trends. However, it is possible to obtain some notion of trends by drawing upon past 
editions of Security Yearbooks, based on annual reports and license figures collected by the 
Dutch Ministry of Justice which go back as far as the early 1980s. In addition, the Dutch 
private security association (VPB) collates figures which are generally seen as the most up-
to-date and comprehensive collection of statistics based on surveys of private security 
companies registered by VPB. Though the number of 60 VPB-members is compared to the 
3 Statistics are on-line available from Statline: http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb/. 
industry’s total size fairly small, outcomes are still valid as they represent all serious players 
covering about 70 percent of the market. Taken together, these figures show a substantial 
private security industry in the Netherlands, and one that has exhibited significant growth in 
recent times. There were 1,380 licensed private security organisations in 2006 compared to 
380 in 1995. Notwithstanding this official number of licenses issued, the private security 
industry estimates that approximately 800 businesses (2003 figures) are active in the market 
of which 250 to 400 have a sizeable presence. The number of contract guard employees has 
grown from 4,348 (1981) to almost 31,000 (2008)4
 
. The gross annual turnover of the private 
guarding sector has grown from €429 million in 1994 to €1.45 billion in 2008 (van Steden, 
2007).  
Turning to Britain, various studies have provided evidence that the commercial security 
sector has expanded substantially over recent decades (Crawford et al., 2005; George & 
Button, 2000; Jones & Newburn, 1995, 1998). In 1951, there were about 67,000 people 
employed as security guards and related occupation, which had grown to over 200,000 by 
1991 (Jones & Newburn, 2006). Crawford et al. (2005) estimated that between 300,000 and 
500,000 people are employed in the private security industry. According to 2003 figures, the 
manned guarding sector estimated annual turnover was over €2.4 billion (£1.8 billion), 
“nearly a threefold increase on the figure 10 years earlier and some 14 times greater than the 
total 20 years previously” (Crawford et al., 2005, p. 13). Industry reports suggest a market 
size of over €3.5 billion (£2.6 billion) generated by those working in security guarding and 
related.5
 
 
There are important differences between the extent and nature of private policing in the two 
countries. For example, whilst both countries have seen significant growth in commercial 
policing, the British security industry, with 275 guarding personnel per 100,000 population, is 
much bigger than its Dutch counterpart (187 per 100,000 population), both in absolute terms 
and in proportion to population size. Furthermore, the commercial security sector has a 
greater functional and spatial remit in Britain than is the case in the Netherlands (Jones, van 
Steden & Boutellier, 2009). Governments in Britain have been more radical in privatizing 
policing and related functions than they have been in the Netherlands. At the same time, 
statutory regulation of the commercial security industry has been a long-standing feature of 
the Netherlands, but was only introduced from 2004 in Britain. These issues will be 
considered in more detail below.  
 
2.2 Other forms of policing provision 
 
In addition to the growth of private security, policing has been pluralized by the emergence of 
new forms of police (and other) patrol provision. In part, these new policing forms have 
arisen in response to growing commercial involvement in the provision of security, and 
governmental attempts to meet growing public demands upon public policing. In the 
Netherlands, a new form of police patrol rank – the ‘police patroller’ (politiesurveillant) – 
was established in 1990 to undertake surveillance functions (Haube, Hofstra, Toornvliet & 
Zandbergen, 1996). In a similar way in Britain the Police Reform Act of 2002 established a 
new ‘patrol’ rank in the police service (‘Police Community Support Officer’ or PCSO), 
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intended to provide a ‘second tier’ of policing. By mid-2005, there were over 6,300 PCSOs 
working with police forces in England & Wales. Other forms of patrol provision have 
emerged organized by local government and other bodies. In the Netherlands, municipalities 
can appoint uniformed ‘city wardens’ (stadswachten) in urban areas. What started as a project 
for long-term unemployed in 1989 has expanded, with about several thousands of such 
personnel currently employed in Dutch cities. Nowadays, several City Surveillance Services 
(Diensten Stadstoezicht) around the Netherlands are professionalizing their operational staff. 
New occupations like city supervisors and order maintainers (gemeentelijke toezichthouders 
en handhavers), mandated to fine people for ‘minor’ offences, occupy an increasingly 
prominent position in the Dutch policing landscape. Similar to traditional stadswachten, 
forms of municipally-employed uniform patrollers have emerged in the UK, most recently 
via the national ‘neighbourhood wardens’ programme (Crawford, 2008). In recent years, 
neighbourhood watch schemes have been set up around the Netherlands. Moroccan 
‘community fathers’ (Marokkaanse buurtvaders), for example, have become famous for their 
work to promote safer neighbourhoods in Amsterdam and The Hague. Their primary goals 
are to forestall public nuisance caused by anti-social behaviour among Moroccan youth and 
to establish fruitful contacts with their parents. In Britain there have also been developments 
in policing ‘below’ the level of state government. A number of authors have highlighted the 
growth of ‘citizen-led’ policing including the expansion of neighbourhood watch since the 
early 1980s, and more recent forms of citizen patrolling (Button, 2002; Johnston, 1992).  
 
2.3 The ‘marketization’ of public policing 
Public policing in both countries has become more complex, with the ‘marketization’ of state 
police forces. These developments were initially driven by political concerns about the 
dramatic growths in expenditure on the police and a desire to promote ‘value for money’. The 
Dutch police have enjoyed sizeable investments in terms of funding and staff numbers over 
recent years. Expenditure on police regions went up from nearly 2000 to about 3500 million 
euros over the last 14 years, and staffing has expanded considerably over the past decade or 
so to about 53,000 of which 36,000 is operational (220 staff per 100,000 population) at 
present. These significant investments in public police organizations have not allayed 
ongoing public concerns about crime and insecurity, and the visibility of police on the street. 
The same period also saw a significant expansion in police staffing and resources in England 
& Wales. In 1993, the number of police officers was about 128,000. This number expanded 
to record levels of about 143,000 in 2006. The equivalent figures for total police staff 
(including civilian administrative and support staff) is 178,000 in 1993, growing to 228,000 
(350 police officers per 100,000 population) in 2006. But despite record increases in police 
staffing and resources, as in the Netherlands, there remains substantial political and public 
concerns about crime and insecurity, and persistent official criticism of the police for the way 
in which these increased resources have been used. There have been ongoing debates in both 
countries about the ‘core tasks’ of the police and how to deliver them most effectively 
(Morgan & Newburn,1997; van der Vijver,  Meershoek & Slobbe, 2001). There has been an 
increasing emphasis in both Britain and in the Netherlands on the rigorous measurement of 
police performance and the imposition of centrally-set performance targets. In Britain this 
dates back to the early 1980s, but has really gathered pace since the late 1990s as part of a 
broader driver to ‘modernise’ public services under New Labour governments. Whilst a form 
of these developments has also emerged in the Netherlands, they are less radical in their 
extent and in their fundamental nature (Jones et al, 2009). The Dutch government has 
introduced targets, which translate into contracts about the number of fines to be imposed. In 
large part, however, police work is unquantifiable, especially when it comes to valuable 
interactions between officers and citizens (Hoogenboezem & Hoogenboezem, 2006).  
 
3. Explanations for the growth of plural policing 
 
A number of common factors appear to have contributed to the pluralization of policing in 
the Netherlands and Britain. These include growing concerns about crime and security, fiscal 
crisis of the public police, the growth of mass private property, government privatization 
policies, and the formalization of social control. We discuss each factor in turn below. 
 
3.1 Growing concerns about crime and security 
 
A commonsense explanation for proliferation of policing forms is the growth of crimes in 
western society. Although recorded and reported crime have been falling in both Britain and 
the Netherlands since the mid- to late-1990s, with a longer timeframe, the picture looks very 
different. For example, between the 1960s and 2007, the number of crime reported to the 
police in the Netherlands has increased by nearly ten times from about 130,000 to 1.2 million 
cases. However, it is doubtful whether recorded crime rates are pervasive predictors for shifts 
in private security. The period of most rapid expansion occurred at a time of stabilization of 
crime rates. Moreover, in the past few years, crime rates have fallen (Wittebrood & 
Nieuwbeerta, 2006). Of more relevance than actual crime victimisation is perhaps the 
constant awareness and fear of crime (and disorder) due to, for example, media coverage 
(Vanderveen, 2006). Thus, the emergence of plural forms of policing may be seen as a 
general response to growing demands for security provision, related in part to perceptions of 
disorder and incivilities (Pastor, 2003). However, the empirical evidence for this argument is 
week. Surveys indicate that (strong) feelings of insecurity are currently at the lowest level 
ever: 22 percent of the Dutch population recently reported to feel occasionally unsafe, with 3 
percent often feel unsafe 6. In Britain, policy-makers have been faced with what Crawford et 
al. (2005) refer to as a ‘reassurance paradox’: “as general crime risks have declined, so 
perceptions of victimisation risks have increased” (p. 2). Despite falling crime rates, anxieties 
about crime and anti social behaviour have continued to grow. This suggests that the growth 
of plural policing may have more to do with generalized insecurity than crime problems per 
se7
 
.  ‘Fear of crime’ may be a proxy for a wide array of diverse and often unconnected social 
anxieties, such as dog dirt in the streets, Islamic fundamentalism, unruly youngsters, to 
uncertainties about the future. This has been related to the advent of a ‘high modern’ 
(Giddens, 1990), ‘reflexive’(Beck, 1992), ‘liquid’ (Bauman, 2000) or ‘networked’ (Castells, 
2000) world in which risk and uncertainty are endemic features. This is ironic because, 
compared to the past, or to developing countries, we actually enjoy unprecedented 
opportunities for living comfortable and rewarding lives (Furedi, 2002). Yet, according to 
Boutellier (2004), this extraordinary sense of personal freedom is exactly what triggers 
today’s (moral) panic: the vibrancy of liberal lifestyles runs up against the need to set 
boundaries. Thus, paradoxically, the flipside of expanding prosperity and freedom is a 
widespread sense of increasing fragility and insecurity, which manifests itself in demands for 
more security provision.  
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3.2 Fiscal crisis of the public police 
 
One way of explaining the growth of alternative policing provision is to suggest that public 
expenditure restrictions have imposed financial constraints on police forces creating a ‘fiscal 
vacuum’ filled up with private security solutions.  The expansion of contract guards, for 
example, could be reasonably taken to be “an indication that those who hire such protection 
feel that public police protection is in some way inadequate” (Becker 1973, p. 44). Radical 
(or Marxist) approaches of this theory see such crises as a natural law of capitalism, which 
undermines both state power and legitimacy (O’Conner, 1973). Regaining its position, the 
government accepts two-tiered – public and private – forms of policing that gradually 
interpenetrate the social fabric of society. While, at the surface, the state appears to be 
devolving power to corporations and civil society, in practice they are expanding their nets of 
social control (Cohen, 1985; Spitzer & Scull, 1977). Viewed through a ‘liberal democratic’ 
lens, however, the expansion of plural policing is a pragmatic and sensible approach to 
preventing crime and disorder. Private security companies and other plural policing bodies 
offer cheaper staff, who are ‘junior partners’ of the police in safeguarding the (quasi-)public 
domain (Button, 2002; Jones & Newburn, 1998). For both radical and liberal democratic 
approaches, however, the empirical evidence is problematic. It is unfeasible to maintain that 
the growth of plural forms of policing can be related to falling numbers of staff employed by 
Dutch or British police forces. On the contrary, the police in both countries have seen very 
significant staffing growth (see discussions on public policing above). However, given the 
constant political and social focus upon security issues (though not necessarily based on 
‘hard’ crime figures) and demands for policing, it is possible to argue that the public police – 
even with the very significant expansion of staff and resources – have been unable to keep 
pace with the demands upon them. This has fuelled the growth both of commercial policing 
and of other forms of ‘plural’ policing provision.  
 
3.3 The growth of mass private property 
 
An important explanation for the expansion of the key element within plural policing – the 
private security industry – concerns large-scale changes in spatial ordering (Kempa, Stenning 
& Wood, 2004; Shearing & Stenning 1983). The urban environment is increasingly 
dominated by new forms of communal space such as fashionable shopping malls, restricted 
clubs and ‘gated’ residential areas that are publicly accessible but privately owned and 
managed. A direct result of this shift in property relations is that policing falls in the hands of 
‘private governments’ (Macaulay, 1986) challenging the old Hobbesian-Weberian ideal 
“where the public sphere is the sphere of governors and the private sphere is the sphere of 
the governed” (Shearing, 2006, p. 31). Contract guards thus take the meaning of ‘security’ 
beyond that of a threat into a world of promise for those who can afford the delights of 
exclusive urban environments (Hadfield, 2008, p. 445; italics in the original). As such, new 
strategies of risk management have less to do with concerns of crime than they have with the 
governance of local ‘moral orders’. Economic rationalities focus on the creation of attractive, 
consumer-friendly sites that represent both enclaves of freedom and networks of dense 
regulation (Valverde & Cirak, 2003). “Control”, as Rose (2000, p.326) notes, “is [therefore] 
better understood as operating through conditional access to circuits of consumption and 
civility; [...] recurrent switch points to be passed in order to access the benefits of liberty”. 
Considering the growth of plural policing in Britain and the Netherlands, there is some truth 
in these arguments. Although these kinds of spaces are much less common in Europe than in 
the USA, there have been significant developments particularly in the retail sector, which is a 
leading purchaser of private security staff and equipment. Data show that the amount of 
systematically developed shopping (i.e., large neighbourhood and community centres) has 
doubled from 400 in the mid-1980s to 800 nowadays in the Netherlands8
 
. British studies 
demonstrate analogous developments: between the 1970s and the mid-1990s, the number of 
shopping centres expanded from 200 to over 1,000. A declining proportion of such facilities 
were located in town centres, in chorus with burgeoning out-of-town retail complexes and 
‘mega’ stores (Jones & Newburn, 1998, 1999).  
However, the growth of mass property should not be taken as the key explanatory factor for 
private security growth (or more broadly, for plural policing). The appearance of mass private 
property – and wider (semi-)closed communal spaces – in the EU is relatively limited 
compared to the United States. The numbers of ‘gated communities’ comprising restricted 
private housing estates (Davis, 1990) and ‘edge cities’ (Garreau, 1992) accommodating 
concentrations of business, leisure and entertainment of the types found in the U.S. are very 
small in Europe. Whilst such developments are restricted in Britain, they are even less 
common in the Netherlands. Hypermarkets (such as Tesco’s) and gated housing 
developments – according to Crawford and Lister (2004), planning authorities indentified 
around 1,000 gated communities in England – are less accepted and widespread than in 
Britain. A further problem with this argument is that private security growth predated the 
growth of mass private property in both countries. A final point relates to the fact that Dutch 
and British security industries are not routinely armed, in contrast with their counterparts in 
many parts of the USA who have the potential to deploy lethal force. Thus, whereas private 
security operations on this side of the Atlantic Ocean mirror in part developments in North 
America, they have their own idiosyncrasies that set them apart in some important ways. 
 
3.4 Government policies toward private sector participation 
 
Garland (1996) has used the term ‘responsibilisation’ policies to denote processes whereby 
the government acknowledges its limited capacities to prevent and control crime, and seeks to 
devolve responsibility to other agencies and individuals. Thus, government policies of 
privatization and devolution of crime control more broadly may explain the ways in which 
policing systems in the Netherlands and Britain have been pluralized in recent decades. From 
the mid-eighties onwards, the Dutch government has emphasized partnership working in the 
sphere of crime control and justice. In this respect, the publication of the 1985 government 
report Society and Crime (Samenleving en Criminaliteit) advocated integration between 
repressive and pro-active policies, framing crime prevention as an ‘administrative problem’ 
for a range of organisations (Ministerie van Justitie, 1985). Some years later, in 1990, the 
policy program Law in Motion (Recht in Beweging) proposed the use of private security 
companies to patrol mass private properties like shopping centres and industrial complexes 
(Tweede Kamer 1990/1991). The same period saw the introduction of what has been termed 
an ‘integral safety policy’. This expanded the concept of crime prevention by connecting it to 
more general issues about quality of life in local areas and how these are influenced by a 
range of services including fire protection and emergency relief (Boutellier, 2001). As a 
result, crime control has become part of the broad safety domain that encompasses areas 
beyond the criminal justice system. The past few years have seen official acceptance of 
private security operations in public space  (Ministerie van Justitie & Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken, 2002). To date, however, the Dutch government has gone no further 
than, allowing the private sector to fulfil subordinate roles (to the public police) in the public 
realm. “Safety policy, even if it is in private hands”, Terpstra (2008a, p.224) notes, “is 
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fundamentally concerned with a public good”. Close oversight of the police and 
municipalities remains a key element of the Dutch approach to involving private security in 
public policing.  
 
The acceptance of private security, and other forms of plural policing, in public safety 
policies has gone further in Britain. The government have used the term ‘police extended 
family’ to denote the deployment of non-police agents in public safety roles (Crawford & 
Lister, 2004; Johnston, 2003). This builds upon a much more radical approach to 
privatization in Britain, dating back to the Thatcher governments of the 1980s. Although this 
was applied relatively late to policing, ‘marketization’ policies have been a striking feature of 
police reform since the early 1990s, under both Conservative and Labour governments. In 
terms of direct privatization, prisoner escort for most prisoners is now delivered by contract 
security, and also civilian detention officers in some forces have been contracted-out to the 
market (Shefer & Liebling, 2008). The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act gave local authorities a 
statutory duty to promote, facilitate and coordinate crime and disorder reduction partnerships 
that entail state as well as non-state organisations. More recently, the British government 
launched a nation-wide ‘neighbourhood warden’ program committed to the revival of 
deprived urban public spaces. These programs signal a ‘privatization of community policing’ 
in the sense that they officially acknowledge the input of commercial patrols in safeguarding 
residential localities and alleviating individuals’ reported fear of crime (Noaks, 2000, 2008). 
Turning to the Netherlands, while commercial security patrols in affluent residential enclaves 
have existed for many years, there has not been a general expansion of private policing on 
residential estates in middle and lower-income areas. Except from some (temporary and 
permanent) local initiatives, national political support for policies aimed at the direct 
stimulation of a ‘mixed market’ for patrol provision is virtually lacking. Another obvious 
contrast concerns the involvement of the Dutch private security industry in the area of penal 
and correctional institutions as discussed above. This involvement is remains comparatively 
restrained in the Netherlands. Although, as in Britain, the multinational company Group 4 
Securicor (G4S) is involved in the provision of ancillary guarding and maintenance services, 
the issue of wholesale contracting-out of penal establishments has yet to appear on the Dutch 
policy agenda. ‘Marketization mentalities’ in the UK have gained much firmer ground than in 
the Netherlands. 
 
A related point concerns governmental approaches to the regulation of private security. As 
noted above, the approaches of Britain and the Netherlands have been very different (Button, 
2007; Button & George, 2006; van Steden & Sarre, 2007).  The Netherlands has a long-
standing tradition of licensing and regulating private security dating back over 70 years. The 
most recent form of regulatory law, the 1997 Private Security Providers and Detective 
Agencies Act (Wet particuliere beveiligingsorganisaties en recherchebureaus), strengthened 
the licensing, training and oversight system for private security companies and their 
employees. Proper enforcement of this law, for which the police and judicial services are 
responsible, is rather weak, however. The British private security industry remained largely 
unregulated up until the introduction of the 2001 Private Security Act that implemented 
compulsory licensing schemes for individuals working in specific parts of the security sector 
along with a voluntary registration scheme for companies. The Act established the Security 
Industry Authority (SIA)9
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Experts expect that the new British licensing regime will push the working conditions and 
www.the-sia.org.uk/home. 
service delivery, as well as the costs incurred, upwards which is likely to slow down the 
burgeoning of private security to some degree (Crawford & Lister, 2004).  
 
3.5 The formalization of social control 
 
Whilst the pluralization of policing is often presented as a fragmentation of policing 
provision, there are compelling reasons to regard it more broadly as a product of 
formalization of previously informal types of social control. Following Jones and Newburn 
(2002), the activities of almost all aspects of ‘plural policing’ outlined earlier in the paper – 
that is those of the public police, private security industry and new forms of policing 
provision – can all be seen as part of ‘primary’ social control. By contrast, secondary social 
controls are delivered by agents such as teachers, park-keepers, caretakers, railway guards, 
bus conductors, etc. – for whom social control activities are not a primary part of their role, 
but form an important secondary aspect of what they do. At a less formal level again, tertiary 
social control includes informal social controls exerted by ‘intermediate’ groups within local 
communities, such as religious organizations, workplaces, trade unions, societies, and 
community groups.  
 
We here argue that current trends in policing in both the Netherlands and in Britain can be 
related to the decline of more informal sources of social control. This relates in part to the 
general decline of ‘community’ institutions associated with tertiary controls, and highlighted 
by a range of authors in their analyses of the ‘disembedding’ processes of  late modernity (see 
above discussion of the work of Giddens (1999), Bauman (2000) and others) . But 
subsequently there has been a marked decline of ‘secondary’ social control activities in terms 
of a range of occupations that once provided ‘natural surveillance’ and other low level 
controls in addition to their main functions (Jones & Newburn, 1998). It is possible to 
demonstrate the decline of such occupations in the UK via use of employment estimates from 
the population Census figures over the 1951 to 1991 period. Figures quoted in Jones and 
Newburn (2002) show a considerable expansion of employment in public policing (from 
85,000 to 150,000 staff). These figures also show the very substantial increases in private 
security and related occupations discussed above (from 67,000 to at least 200,000 staff). But 
perhaps the key point is the evidence for the declining visibility of ‘secondary social control’ 
occupations such as ‘roundsmen/women’ (the house-to-house delivery of milk, bread and 
other goods), bus and tram conductors, rail ticket inspectors, and train guards. In particular, 
the number of bus and tram conductors suggests a quite dramatic fall from 97,000 (1951) to 
almost 2,500 (1991) staff due to public savings and new labour-saving technologies such as 
ticket machines. The Census figures thus suggest very substantial declines in these kinds of 
occupations, whilst ‘primary social control’ in the form of both public and private policing 
has expanded.  
 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to obtain similarly detailed employment figures from the 
Netherlands Statistics Bureau. Our observations are therefore limited to anecdotical 
information. The rise in and diversity of new security patrols in the Netherlands may be best 
illustrated by the observation that, alongside the regular police, as many as thirteen to fifteen 
different types of policing occupations are active in  some parts of Amsterdam (Terpstra, 
2008b). In this respect, the employment of so-called ‘streetcoaches’ (straatcoaches) by the 
municipality of Amsterdam is an interesting example. These streetcoaches, provided by a 
private security firm, aim to tackle youth nuisance on the streets. They represent a team of 
security patrols and social workers whose main tasks are to exert social control, prevent 
disorder and visit the parents of troublemakers (van Steden & Jones, 2008). At the same time, 
Terpstra (2008b, p.110) stresses that over the 1980s and 1990s, “for reasons of cost reduction 
and financial cutbacks, many jobs which had primarily a service function but which in 
practice also had an important (informal, secondary) task of control and surveillance, were 
eliminated or cutback. Workers like caretakers, conductors, platform guards, and wardens in 
blocks of flats almost disappeared in those years”. Hence, there is a strong recognition that, 
as an adverse consequence of this policy, the Dutch police increasingly rely on other social 
control agents such as city wardens and contract guards who have formed all sorts of 
relationships with public constabularies.  
 
4. Interpreting differences  
 
The documented changes in policing in the Netherlands and England & Wales – and, to 
differing degrees, similar developments in other parts of the world – do suggest that 
fundamental forces are at work. Most striking, the widespread ‘search for security’ (Law 
Commission of Canada, 2002), in Britain and the Netherlands alike, relates to wider changes 
in social and cultural configurations conducive to increasing insecurity and the growing 
politicization of crime control that put governments under pressure (Garland, 2000). Public 
authorities realize that the traditional judicial emphasis on prosecution, punishment and 
detention has its limitations. In particular police forces have helped to establish ‘preventative 
partnerships’, which create a whole new infrastructure of crime control beyond the 
institutional remits of the state (Hughes & Edwards, 2002; Loader, 2000; Terpstra & 
Kouwenhoven, 2004). Furthermore, in both countries, we observed a transfer of functions 
and responsibilities from the public to the private realm. Informal (primary and secondary) 
forms of social control have changed places with private security guards. It is plausible that 
this marked decline in informal social control is linked to public savings on behalf of 
occupations providing ‘natural surveillance’ (such as train conductors), but also that rapid 
rises in (fear of) crime have contributed to the formal policing division of labour and 
‘exclusionary strategies’ towards deviants (Young, 1999). The argument that mass private 
property has stimulated private security growth is not so well supported outside of North 
America. It appears that developments such as those in the USA have been much more 
restricted in Britain and even less common again in the Netherlands. 
 
Whilst parallel trajectories towards the ‘pluralization’ and ‘privatization’ of policing can be 
identified in the Netherlands and England & Wales, many important contrasts remain. The 
contrasts between the political institutions of both nations are surely crucial in this regard. 
Although similar in some ways to the UK, the Dutch political system comprises a sharply 
contrasting set of political institutions, shaped by a distinctive democratic tradition and 
political culture. This has important implications for the politics of policing in the 
Netherlands, and in our view is the prime explanation for some of the central differences 
between Dutch and British policing that we described previously. The UK is a common law 
country, with a ‘first past the post’ electoral system that has, for the majority of the last 
century or so, been dominated by two parties. This system is likely to produce clear 
governmental programmes between which the electorate can choose, and which the electorate 
can do little to resist in between elections. In stark contrast to Britain, in the Netherlands, 
social ‘pillarization’ was a vertical pluralism based on four distinct ideologies; a liberal pillar 
of middle-class secular citizens, pillars incorporating the Protestant and Catholic 
communities respectively, and finally a Social Democratic pillar incorporating the labour 
movement. Lijphart (1968) argued that rather than be a source of instability, pillarization was 
the key development that helped Dutch society remain relatively stable in the face of these 
fundamental social divisions. Social divisions can be offset by the existence of 
accommodation, cooperation and compromise at the elite levels, realized by a distinctive set 
of political institutions and cultural traditions. 
 
A resulting distinctive feature of the Dutch political system has been the tendency towards 
‘non-decision making’ in the case of controversial or divisive issues. This is achieved by the 
appointment of an expert commission to deal with particular issues, which can take the 
political sting out of divisive matters by removing their discussion to the technical sphere. In 
a later edition of his book, Lijphart (1975) noted a process of ‘de-pillarization’ had developed 
in the Netherlands, with the autonomous pillars described above beginning to crumble during 
the 1960s. Society became increasingly secular, electoral behaviour became more volatile, 
many new non-pillarized organizations emerged, and there was less cohesiveness within the 
existing pillars (Lijphart, 1975). Such processes of de-pillarization have had major 
consequences for Dutch society, and in particular have been associated with a major decline 
in sources of informal social control, and increasing levels of crime and disorder. 
Nevertheless, even though recent years have seen major changes in the politics of crime and 
policing in the Netherlands (Pakes, 2005), compared to Britain, the Dutch political system 
itself remains much more weighted against the introduction of radical change and reform. 
Particularly when it comes to ‘market-based’ reforms to policing, the less marked 
developments in the Netherlands may reflect a more deep-seated suspicion of devolving core 
governmental powers to commercial corporations than exists in the UK. The private security 
industry has always been subject to much more regulation than its counterpart in more 
laissez-faire Britain, and there is much more political controversy surrounding the incursion 
of commercial security operatives into the traditional public sphere of residential streets and 
parks. The same issue applies to reforms that allow the police to sell their services to private 
buyers. This reflects a different political conception of the state as the unambiguous 
controller of the public sphere, and a degree of caution about allowing profit-making 
companies to deliver what are still viewed as quintessentially ‘public’ services. Although 
privatization has certainly occurred in the Netherlands, it remains a significantly more 
‘welfare-oriented’ society, with higher levels of public spending as a proportion of GDP, and 
much less in the way of contracting-out of local government services. In terms of 
pluralization, whilst some aspects of these wider shifts are visible in the Netherlands, the 
distinctive political culture and institutional framework have moderated their extent, when set 
against developments in England & Wales. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has described the growth of plural policing in the Netherlands and Britain, and has 
discussed explanations for this growth. The focus has been, therefore, on the common 
features of the British and Dutch experiences. However, despite similar trends towards 
‘plural’ and ‘private’ policing, the paper has also highlighted some important differences 
between the changes in policing in the Netherlands and Britain respectively. In particular, the 
expansion of private security, whilst significant, has been noticeably less striking in the 
Netherlands, most clearly in numerical terms, but also in terms of the spatial and functional 
reach of the contract security industry. In addition, there has been a much more radical 
approach to the privatization of the public sector more generally (and policing in particular) 
in Britain than in the Netherlands. The marketization of policing – both in terms of 
contracting out of public policing functions and in terms of the application of performance 
measures to the police service- has been more far-reaching in Britain than in the Dutch 
context. Thus, whilst the overall picture – the trends towards privatization and pluralization 
and the broad structural explanations for this – is one of similarity, important areas of 
difference remain. Although there is not the space to consider this in detail here, we believe 
that these differences reflect the important political and cultural differences between the two 
countries. In particular, the distinctive Dutch system of political compromise and 
accommodation simultaneously places the central state as the ultimate arbiter of the ‘public 
good’ as well as placing formidable obstacles in the way of radical political reforms, such as 
occurred in Britain during the 1980s. Within policing and security, this more cautious 
approach to especially private policing is visible in a number of ways. The Dutch private 
security industry has always been subject to more stringent legal regulations than in Britain, 
and there is much more political controversy surrounding the incursion of commercial 
security operatives into the conventional public sphere of, for example, residential areas. 
Thus, in spite of strong areas of convergence, in terms of the overall growth of plural forms 
of policing, the persistence of divergence in policing trajectories emphasizes the importance 
of the need for detailed cross national studies that take account of differences, as well as 
similarity. Specifically, a more detailed analysis of political and cultural factors can serve as a 
good starting point for further comparative research. 
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